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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that the power of the state to tax is virtually
limitless, and that the power to tax involves the power to destroy;'
indeed, taxation is one of the chief tools by which tyranny can be
imposed upon a nation.2 It is for this reason that Anglo-American law has
long-characterized the taxing power as legislative in character,3 that is, it
is only legitimately exercisable by the people themselves or by their duly
elected representatives. 4 The rationale for lodging this awesome and
potentially destructive power in the legislature is manifest: it accords
with the nature of taxes themselves 5 and ensures that those imposing the
tax are held accountable to the electorate who bears their burden. 6 In
t The author would like to thank Henry Aronson for bringing this issue to his attention, and Bill
Severson and Norm Bruns for their insights and guidance.
1. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
2. See I THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION § 21 (4th ed. 1924). According to
Cooley, the principle of self taxation is the chief security against oppression. Relying on the works
of Burke, Locke, and Madison, he explains that "the chief importance of those who pay taxes to vote
[for] them ... [is that it] constitutes the only substantial and continuous check upon tyranny[.]"
3. Id. at § 64; see also Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515, 517-18 (1880); State ex rel.
Nettleton v. Case, 39 Wash. 177, 182, 81 P. 554, 556 (1905) (A tax is a burden or charge "imposed
by legislative authority on persons or property, to raise money for public purposes").
4. 1 COOLEY, supra note 2, § 21.
5. Id. at §§ 3, 7; see also Nettleton, 39 Wash. at 181, 81 P. 554, 556; BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1469 (7th ed. 1999) (defining tax as "[a] monetary charge imposed by the government
on persons, entities, or property to yield public revenue"). Black's goes on to quote Thomas M.
Cooley by explaining that taxes are "the enforced proportional contributions from persons and
property, levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all
public needs." This definition, according to Black's, has been widely endorsed.
6. See generally I COOLEY, supra note 2, at § 21; THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 517 (1868).
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short, legislative control of the taxing power avoids "taxation without
representation." Washington law and its political structures reflect this
fundamental principle of American democracy.7
A consistent and equally fundamental doctrine prohibits the
legislature from delegating its legislative power, particularly in the case
of taxation, to other entities. 8 Article II, section 1 of the Washington
Constitution explicitly vests all legislative power in the state legislature
and generally bars it from delegating that power.9 Additionally, although
municipal corporations possess no inherent power to tax,10 article VII,
section 9 and article XI, section 12 provide an exception: together, these
sections permit the legislature to delegate the taxing power to the"corporate authorities" of local municipal corporations for local
purposes.1 The Seattle Monorail Project (SMP), however, raises serious
questions about the extent to which the state constitution permits a
municipal corporation governed by an unelected1 2 board to levy local
taxes.
7. See infra Parts II.B-C.
8. I COOLEY, supra note 2, §§ 74, 75, 78. It is important to distinguish the difference between
the delegation of authority to administrative agencies and the delegation of the taxing power. Only
the latter is the focus of this article. It is widely accepted that, although the taxing power may not be
delegated to an unelected and unaccountable entity over whom the electorate has no control, certain
ministerial functions may be properly delegated. I THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION
99-107 (3d ed. 1903). Ministerial functions are generally those that have a specific and temporary
character. Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't v. City of Spokane, 99 Wash. 2d 339, 347, 662
P.2d 845, 850 (1983). These functions are also characterized by the application of already
established rules or by the pursuit of an already established plan. Id. Ministerial functions do not
include the more complex legislative determinations of the appropriate level at which to levy a tax or
on what budgetary items such funds should be spent. Conversely, legislative actions are more
permanent and general in character, and often prescribe new policy. Id. The legislature may delegate
incidents of the taxing power to administrative bodies when the discretion of such bodies is limited
by explicit legislative standards by which that power may be exercised. I COOLEY, supra at 99-107.
Thus, the legislature must create the rules and determine the mode of application of the tax, and the
delegatee may oversee its implementation and collection. Id. The purpose of this rule is to ensure
that the legislature-the entity accountable to the taxpaying public and entrusted with the taxing
power by the constitution-makes the decisions it is charged with, and the unaccountable agency
merely implements them.
9. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. Many Washington cases articulate well the constitutional
requirements for delegating legislative power. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v.
State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 233-34, 11 P.3d 762, 794 (2000), amended at 27 P.3d 608 (explaining that,
"[u]nder art. II, § 1, [t]he legislative authority of the State is vested in the Legislature ... and it is
unconstitutional for the Legislature to abdicate or transfer its legislative function to others").
10. See, e.g., Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wash. 2d 347, 352,
178 P.2d 351, 354 (1947).
11. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 9; art. XI, § 12.
12. The Seattle Monorail Project Board of Directors consists of nine members, only two of
whom are directly elected by the taxpaying Seattle electorate. See infra Part II1.C. The seven other
members are appointed. See infra Part III.C. Under Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle,
751 F. Supp. 885, 891-93 (W.D. Wash. 1990), the "character" of the board should be determined by
how the majority of its seats are filled. The court in Cunningham explained that when a majority of a
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Following Seattle voter approval of an initiative to create a citywide
monorail transportation system, 13 the Washington State Legislature
passed Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6464 (the "Enabling Act" or
"Enabling Legislation"), which permits cities with over 300,000
residents to create a city transportation authority (CTA) to plan, develop,
and operate a citywide monorail transportation system. 14 It also
authorizes CTAs to issue bonds and levy various taxes to fund such
systems. 15 However, because the Enabling Act permits CTAs to be
governed by unelected governing bodies16 it created the potential for an
un-elected and unaccountable board to levy taxes.
This potential became reality in November 2002 when Seattle
voters approved Seattle Citizen Petition No. I ("Petition 1" or the
"Petition"). 17 Petition 1 created a CTA called the Seattle Monorail
Project (SMP) and authorized it to issue up to $1.5 billion in bonds and
to levy a motor vehicle excise tax (MVET) of up to 1.4% to fund the
repayment of those bonds. 18 The SMP is governed by a board consisting
of seven appointed members and two members elected at large by Seattle
voters. 19 Its un-elected composition notwithstanding, by its own actions
municipality's governing board is elected, it must be characterized as an "elected body." Id. at 893.
The SMP can be clearly characterized as either "appointed" or "unelected."
13. In November 1997, Seattle voters passed Initiative 41, which established the Elevated
Transportation Company (ETC), a public corporation tasked with planning and building a 40 mile
monorail mass transit system within the city. See Initiative 41, art. 4, available at
http://archives.elevated.org/archives documents/initiative 41.shtm (last visited July 10, 2005);
Alyssa Burrows, Seattle and Washington Officials Appoint the Elevated Transportation Company
(ETC) Board to Comply With Initiative 41 on February 17, 1998, available at
http://www.historylink.org/essays/output.cfm?file-id=4285 (Mar. 26, 2004). Shortly thereafter,
monorail supporters Peter Sherwin and Cleve Stockmeyer drafted Initiative 53, which required the
city to provide the ETC with $6 million to develop a specific plan to build, finance, and operate the
monorail. Seattle Initiative 53, IM 1-4, 2000 Seattle Election - General Election Voters' Guide,
available at http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/ethics/elOOa/report/vpg/monorlct.htm (last visited July 24,
2005). Initiative 53 required that, once prepared, the plan would then be submitted to Seattle voters
for approval. Id. at 4; Kery Murakami, City Refuses to Spend More Money on Monorail Board,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, August 1, 2000, at B-1; Kery Murakami, Petitions Filed for Putting
Monorail Issue to a Vote, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, August 18, 2000, at B8; Kery Murakami,
Next Stop the Ballot?; Not for Monorail; Too Few Names, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
September 8, 2000, at BI. On November 7, 2000, 56.36% of Seattle voters approved Initiative 53.
King County Elections Results, available at http://www.metrokc.gov/elections/2000nov/
respage I1 .htm (Dec. 1, 2000).
14. 2002 Wash. Laws 248 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A (2005)).
15. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.95A.070, 080 (2002).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.030 (2002) (providing that a governing body may be
"appointed or elected").
17. Seattle Citizen Petition No. 1, approved November 5, 2002.
18. Id. at §§ 6(a), (c).
19. Id. at § 4.
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the SMP has levied the MVET at varying levels within the voter-
approved 1.4% ceiling.20
The composition and actions of the un-elected SMP Board raise the
question of whether the Washington State Constitution permits the
legislature to delegate its taxing power to municipal corporations
governed by unelected boards. Stated differently, the SMP Board and its
actions present the question of whether the Washington State
Constitution requires that local taxes be imposed only by officials who
are elected by, and accountable to, the electorate burdened by the tax.2'
While Washington's Constitution, political structures, and legal doctrine
are designed to prevent "taxation without representation," the recent case
of Granite Falls Library Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls has
blurred the contours of these safeguards.
This Article analyzes whether the legislature has unconstitutionally
permitted "taxation without representation" by delegating its legislative
taxing power to the SMP. It argues that the Washington State
Constitution permits the delegation of the taxing power to municipal
corporations only when the legislative organs of those entities are
directly elected by or otherwise accountable to the tax burdened
electorate. Further, it argues that, because the SMP fulfills neither of
these requirements, it is constitutionally unable to levy the MVET. Part
II analyzes the Anglo-American legal system's historical prohibition on
taxation without representation and analyzes Washington cases that
address this prohibition. Further, it argues that Washington's prohibition
on taxation without representation does not permit delegation of taxing
authority to officials who are unaccountable to the electorate burdened
by the tax. Part III applies this rule to the facts surrounding the
composition and activities of the SMP, arguing that because it is
governed by an unelected board, it is constitutionally unfit to levy the
MVET. It argues further that neither voter approval of neither the MVET
nor the governing structure of the SMP can cure this fundamental
deficiency. Part IV concludes by recommending that the Washington
Supreme Court clarify the precise boundaries of the state's prohibition on
20 . See infra Part II.B; see also Seattle Monorail Project Construction, at http://
www.elevated.org/construction (last visited July 10, 2005).
21. In July 2005 the SMP abandoned its financing plan and two of its most vociferous board
members resigned. Seattle Times Staff, Monorail Leaders Resign, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 4,
2005, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/monorailU2002357262_webmonorai04
.html. These events have raised serious questions about whether the SMP should be dissolved and
the project abandoned. Even if such actions were taken, they would not answer the fundamental
question regarding how and when the taxing power may be delegated to the corporate authorities of
municipal corporations in Washington State.
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taxation without representation in order to preserve its continued
application and ensure the continuation of the protections it affords.
II. WASHINGTON PERMITS DELEGATION OF THE TAXING POWER
TO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE
COMPOSED OF ELECTED OFFICIALS OVER WHOM THE
TAX-BURDENED ELECTORATE RETAINS CONTROL.
In determining whether the SMP has unconstitutionally levied the
MVET, it is important to first define taxes, identify entities that may
impose them, and determine under what circumstances the taxing power
may be delegated. Subsection A explores the historical origins of
America's prohibition on taxation without representation and explains
that Anglo-American law has long characterized the taxing power as one
that is "legislative" in character. It describes taxes as typically being
22conceived of as a "grant" of the people to their government, explaining
that taxes may therefore be imposed only by the people themselves or by
their duly elected representatives. 23 Subsection B examines
Washington's legal doctrine and political structures and demonstrates
how they reflect this important concept. Lastly, subsection C explains
that Washington permits its legislature to delegate the taxing power to
municipal corporations. 24 It argues, however, that to avoid "taxation
without representation," the Washington State Constitution only permits
delegation of the taxing power to municipal officials who are elected by,
and accountable to, the tax-burdened electorate.
A. The Historical Origins and Justifications
of the Legislative Taxing Power.
Anglo-American law has long characterized the power of taxation
as one that is necessarily legislative in character.25 This is evident from
22. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515, 517-18 (1880); State ex rel. Nettleton v.
Case, 39 Wash. 177, 182, 81 P. 554, 556 (1905) (a tax is a burden or charge "imposed by legislative
authority on persons or property, to raise money for public purposes"); see generally, 1 COOLEY,
supra note 2, § 1.
23. "England has no written constitution, it is true; but it has an unwritten one, resting in the
acknowledged, and frequently declared, privileges of Parliament and the people, to violate which in
any material respect would produce a revolution in an hour. A violation of one of the fundamental
principles of that constitution in the Colonies, namely, the principle that recognizes the property of
the people as their own, and which, therefore, regards all taxes for the support of government as gifts
of the people through their representatives, and regards taxation without representation as subversive
of free government, was the origin of our own revolution." In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 115 (1872) (Bradley, J. dissenting).
24. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 9; art. X1, § 12; 1 COOLEY, supra note 2, § 75 n.56.
25 1 COOLEY, supra note 2, § 64; 1 COOLEY, supra note 8, at 43-45, 100. See also Meriwether, 102
U.S. at 515 ("[Taxation] is a high act of sovereignty, to be performed only by the legislature upon
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the fact that taxation itself "is the making of rules and regulations under
which the necessary revenues for all the needs of government are to be
apportioned from among the people and collected from them.",26 Because
taxes themselves are a "grant" of the people to their government, they
must be made by the "immediate representatives of the people., 27 Stated
another way, the people possess "the sole right to determine, through
their chosen representatives, what grants of supplies shall be made for
the support of the state and how the burden of taxation which they entail
shall be distributed., 28 In our political and legal system, it is therefore
axiomatic that the power of taxation belongs to the legislature.
The justification for lodging the taxing power in the legislature
rests, in large part, upon the fact that doing so helps to prevent tyranny
and oppression .29 Although the notion that there can be no lawful
taxation levied by the sovereign unless granted by the representatives of
the people originated in England, it was in America that it took on
particular significance. 30 In response to Great Britain's odious taxing of
considerations of policy, necessity, and the public welfare. In the distribution of the powers of
government in this country into three departments, the power of taxation falls to the legislative. It
belongs to that department to determine what measures shall be taken for the public welfare, and to
provide the revenues for the support and due administration of the government throughout the State
and in all its subdivisions. Having the sole power to authorize the tax, it must equally possess the
sole power to prescribe the means by which the tax shall be collected, and to designate the officers
through whom its will shall be enforced."); Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462,467, 44 P.2d 175,
177 (1935) ("the power to tax necessarily falls within the legislative branch of government"); State
v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 137, 6 P.2d 619, 622 (1932) ("the legislative branch of government has the
exclusive power of taxation); Nettleton, 39 Wash. at 182, 81 P. at 556 (a tax is a burden or charge
"imposed by legislative authority on persons or property, to raise money for public purposes").
26. 1 COOLEY, supra note 8, at 43.
27. Id.; State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs v. Clausen, 96 Wash. 214, 225-26, 163 P. 744, 747
(1917) (indicating that the state's power to tax is granted by the people to the state for their benefit,
and is subject to their ultimate authority).
28. DAVID A. WELLS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TAXATION 116 (1900). According to the
Supreme Court, "the power of determining what persons and property shall be taxed belongs
exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, and, whether exercised by the legislature
itself, or delegated by it to a municipal corporation, is strictly a legislative power. New Orleans
Water-Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U.S. 18, 31 (1888).
29. 1 COOLEY, supra note 8, at 97 n.2.
30. Id. at 97. America's Founding Fathers were strongly influenced by English Enlightenment
thinkers such as John Locke, who proposed radical new conceptions regarding the structure of
government and its relationship to the citizenry. According to Locke, the legitimate exercise of
legislative power required officials "to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in
particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country
man at plough. Secondly, these laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the
good of the people. Thirdly, they must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the
consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such
governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved
any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly, the
legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any
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the colonies, including imposition of the Stamp Act of 1765, colonists
articulated the concept that "taxation without representation is
tyranny." 31 The colonists' assertion that there could be no taxation
without representation meant that local laws, particularly those relating
to taxation, could not be made but by local legislatures.32 This notion was
a rejection of Great Britain's assertion that members of Parliament
adequately represented the entire nation, including the colonists, 33 rather
than the limited property owning constituency that had elected them. The
colonists' rejection of this assertion ultimately gave rise to the American
Revolution's rallying cry of "no taxation without representation. 3 4
Since then, the notion that there can be no taxation without
representation has become enshrined in our nation's political structures
and legal doctrine. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in M'Culloch v.
Maryland,
[i]t is admitted, that the power of taxing the people and their property,
is essential to the very existence of government, and may be
legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the
utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. The
only security against the abuse of this power, is found in the structure
of the government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its
constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous
and oppressive taxation. The people of a state, therefore, give to their
government a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the
exigencies of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to
the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the
legislator, and on the influence of the constituent over their
representative, to guard them against its abuse. 35
This powerful language demonstrates that principles of local tax exaction
are embodied not only in our national government, but also at the state
and local levels. Washington State is no exception.
where, but where the people have." John Locke, Second Essay Concerning Civil Government, in OF
THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER Chap. XI, § 142 (1690).
31. JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 31, 138, 212-13, 215, 220
(1943); Gregory C. Sisk, Questioning Dialogue by Judicial Decree: A Different Theory of
Constitutional Review and Moral Discourse, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1691, 1720 n.100 (1994) (citing
ROBERT MIDDLEKAUF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE 76-93 (1982)).
32. 1 COOLEY, supra note 8, at 96 (noting in particular that the concept does not mean, as is
commonly thought, that no person was to be subject to taxation unless someone he had a voice in
electing voted on it).
33. Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the United
States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 571 (1994).
34. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 167-75
(1967).
35. 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819).
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B. Washington Law Accords with These Historical Principles.
Washington's political institutions and legal doctrine accord with
the historic Anglo-American characterization of the taxing power as
legislative in character.3 6 The Washington Constitution proclaims that
"[a]ll political power is inherent in the people, 37 and the Washington
courts have recognized that the people of Washington have adopted their
constitution to establish a government through which they may exercise
their sovereign power.38 The state's power to tax is considered an
incident of sovereignty that is inherent in the state, as government cannot
exist or function without it. 39 Therefore, the ultimate locus of political
authority and legitimacy in Washington originates with the people and
remains vested in them, except to the extent that they expressly surrender
it to a "higher" sovereignty.40
Consistent with these principles, the people of Washington vest
legislative power, including the power to tax, in the state legislature.1
Article I, section 1 states that "[t]he legislative authority of the state of
Washington shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of a senate and
house of representatives, which shall be called the legislature of the state
of Washington[.],, 42 Hence, the state legislature possesses the corpus of
the state's legislative power.43 The legislature exercises broad plenary
authority over taxation,4 4 to be exercised subject to the considerations of
public policy and welfare,4 5 and the limits of the constitution.46
Although the legislature's taxing power is plenary,47 it remains
checked as a result of its members being elected by, and directly
36. This characterization, therefore, also requires that the taxing power must be exercised by
the people, or by their elected representatives, in order to be legitimate. See State ex rel. Tax
Comm'n. v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 137, 6 P.2d 619, 621 (1932) ("[T]he legislative branch of the
government has the exclusive power of taxation... "); see also Gruen v. Tax Comm'n., 35 Wash.
2d 1, 7, 211 P.2d 651,656 (1949) (the legislature is the chosen representative of the people); State ex
rel. Linn v. Superior Court for King County, 20 Wash. 2d 138, 151-53, 146 P.2d 543, 550-51 (1944)
(under our constitution the people are the source of all legislative authority).
37. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 1; State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 443, 71 P. 20, 21 (1902).
38. Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wash. 2d 211, 216, 163 P.2d 594, 596 (1945).
39. Ryan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 130-31,61 P.2d 1276, 1283 (1938).
40. Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 467, 44 P.2d 175, 177 (1935); see also
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 238, 11 P.3d 762, 796 (2000).
41. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1; Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 245, 11 P.3d at 800.
42. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
43. This legislative power, however, remains subject to the people's reserved rights of
initiative and referendum. See id.; see also State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 628, 66 P.2d 360, 362
(1937).
44. Japan Line Ltd. v. McCaffree, 88 Wash. 2d 93, 96, 558 P.2d 211,213 (1977).
45. Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 156, 50 P.2d 36, 40 (1935).
46. Alaska S.S. Co. v. State, 31 Wash. 2d 328, 333-34, 196 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1948); Ryan v.
State, 188 Wash. 115, 130, 61 P.2d 1276, 1282 (1938).
47. Japan Line Ltd., 88 Wash. 2d at 96, 558 P.2d at 213.
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accountable to, the taxpaying public. The Washington Constitution
specifically provides for the election and removal of state representatives
and senators by way of regularly held elections.48 The electorate's ability
to express its assent or disapproval for a particular tax (or any other law)
by voting to retain or remove representatives responsible for imposing
the tax is thus a hallmark of Washington's legislative branch, and one
that accords with the Anglo-American tradition's longstanding principle
that there can be no valid taxation without representation.49
In addition to vesting legislative power in the legislature,
Washington's citizens have reserved certain legislative powers, including
the taxing power, in themselves in the form of the initiative and
referendum.50 Article I, section 1 indicates that "the people reserve to
themselves the power to propose bills, laws and to enact or reject the
same at the polls, independent of the legislature, and also reserve power,
at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any act item, section,
or part of any bill, act or law passed by the legislature. 51 When approved
in the manner required by the state constitution, an initiative expresses
"the same power of sovereignty as that exercised by the legislature in the
passage of a statute.52 The same is true for properly passed referenda.5 3
When the taxpaying electorate votes to impose a tax upon itself, such
action is plainly consistent with the democratic principles of taxation.
By reserving the legitimate exercise of the taxing power to the
people or their elected legislature, Washington law embraces axiomatic
Anglo-American legal principles. Washington citizens may directly levy
a tax upon themselves through initiative or referendum; alternatively, the
legislature may, acting as elected representatives of the people, impose a
tax in their name. These modes of exercising the taxing power ensure
that taxes are always imposed by persons accountable to the taxpaying
electorate and guarantee citizens the right to express their continuing
assent or disapproval for any given tax. The constitution's allocation of
the taxing power to the people and its representatives, however, would be
of little use if either could easily abandon it.
48. WASH. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 4-6 (vesting legislative power in the legislature and providing
for regular elections of senators and representatives).
49. See supra Part I.A.
50. WASH. CONST. art. 11, § I, as amended by amend. 7; Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d
at 237-38, 11 P.3d at 796-97; Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash. 2d 820, 822-23, 505 P.2d 447, 449
(1973).
51. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1.
52. Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 469, 44 P.2d 175, 178 (1935).
53. Ballasiotes v. Gardner, 97 Wash. 2d 191, 195, 642 P.2d 397, 399 (1982) (explaining that
the referendum power is not an inherent right of the people and must be reserved).
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C. The Legislature Generally May Not Delegate its Taxing Power.
The legislature is generally barred from delegating the power to tax
in order to preserve the constitution's allocation of the taxing power.54
The justification for this prohibition is, at least in part, to prevent the evil
of taxation without representation; as one learned treatise has stated, "[i]t
is not competent for the legislature to delegate its power of taxation,
wholly or in part, to either of the other departments of government, or to
any individual, private corporation, officer, board, or commission."5 5
Indeed, if the legislature were permitted to abdicate its taxing power, the
constitutional protections of representative government afforded to the
people would be of little meaning.
Across both time and a wide range of jurisdictions, American
courts have consistently upheld the fundamental principle that prohibits
56the legislature from delegating the taxing power. Washington courts are
no exception,5 7 though in Washington, this non-delegation rule is subject
to at least one narrow exception.
1. The Washington Constitution Permits Delegating
the Taxing Power to Municipal Corporations.
A narrow exception to the general rule barring delegation of the
legislative taxing power concerns delegation to local municipal
corporations. Unlike the state legislature, municipal corporations have no
inherent power to tax.58 The Washington Constitution, however, contains
at least two complementary provisions that permit the legislature to
delegate taxing authority to municipal corporations. The first provision,
article VII, section 9, specifically empowers the legislature to vest the
taxing power in municipal corporations. 59 It provides that:
54. 1 COOLEY, supra note 8, at 99-100.
55. 37 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, Taxation 724-25 (1911) (observing, however,
that an exception exists for municipal corporations).
56. 1 COOLEY, supra note 8, at 45, 100; see also State ex rel. Howe v. City of Des Moines, 72
N.W. 639, 641 (Iowa 1897); Vallelly v. Bd. of Park Comm'rs of Park Dist. of Grand Forks, 111
N.W. 615, 618 (N.D. 1907); Atlantic City Casino Hotel Ass'n v. Casino Control Comm'n, 496 A.2d
714, 717 (N.J. Super. 1985); Greater Poughkeepsie Library Dist. v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 618
N.E.2d 127, 130 (N.Y. 1993); Danson v. Casey, 382 A.2d 1238, 1241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978);
Wilson v. Philadelphia School Dist., 195 A. 90, 94 (Pa. 1937); Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 492
S.E.2d 79, 81-82 (S.C. 1997); State ex rel. Ledbetter v. Duncan, 702 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tenn. 1985).
57. See infra Part II.C. I (discussing Washington cases).
58. 16 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 44.05 (3rd ed. 2005); see also Arborwood Idaho, L.L.C. v.
City of Kennewick, 151 Wash. 2d 359, 365-66, 89 P.3d 217, 221 (2004); Pacific First Federal Sav.
& Loan Ass'n. v. Pierce County, 27 Wash. 2d 347, 352-53, 178 P.2d 351, 354 (1947); Ivy Club
Investors Ltd. P'ship v. City of Kennewick, 40 Wash. App. 524, 528, 699 P.2d 782, 784 (1985) ("If
the legislature does not authorize a municipality to levy a tax, it is invalid no matter how necessary it
might be.").
59. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
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The legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns
and villages with power to make local improvements by special
assessment, or by special taxation of property benefited. For all
corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with
authority to assess and collect taxes and such taxes shall be uniform in
respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body
levying the same. 60
This provision, however, is not self executing, and therefore requires that
municipalities receive express authority, either constitutional or
legislative, if they are to properly levy taxes. 61 The extent of a municipal
corporation's taxing authority is limited to that which is expressly
granted by the legislature or necessarily implied.62
Article XI, section 12 contains a related provision that describes the
entities to which the legislature may delegate its taxing authority. That
section states:
The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties,
cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or
property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes,
but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, the
power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes.63
This second provision is a limitation upon the legislature's power to
delegate the taxing power to anyone other than the local authorities of the
municipal corporation involved.64 It effectively prevents the state from
imposing taxes upon its subdivisions for local purposes, instead requiring
it to vest local authorities with the power to tax for local needs.65 This
"home rule" principle is consistent with the deep-seated Anglo-American
principle of keeping taxation as close to the tax-burdened electorate as
66possible.
Together, article VII, section 9 and article XI, section 12 create an
exception to the general non-delegation rule which permits delegation of
the taxing authority to the "corporate authorities" of municipal
corporations. However, these provisions fail to explicitly define what
constitutes the "corporate authorities" of a municipality.
60. Id.
61. Arborwood, 151 Wash. 2d at 366, 89 P.3d at 221.
62. 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 58, § 44; Pacific First, 27 Wash. 2d at 352, 178 P.2d at 354; Ivy
Club Investors, 40 Wash. App. at 528, 699 P.2d at 784; see also 37 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
PROCEDURE, Taxation, supra note 55, at 724-25.
63. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 12.
64. State ex rel. Tax Comm'n. v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 139, 6 P.2d 619, 622 (1932).
65. State ex rel. Latimer v. Henry, 28 Wash. 38, 45, 68 P. 368, 371 (1902).
66. See supra Part l.B.
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a. In Washington, "Corporate Authorities" Refers
to the Legislative Organ of a Municipality.
The Washington State Constitution prohibits the legislature from
taxing counties, towns, cities and other municipalities for local purposes,
but allows it to vest in the "corporate authorities" of those municipalities
the power to levy such taxes.67 In Washington, the term "corporate
authorities" refers to the organ of the municipal corporation that
exercises legislative authority-most commonly, the mayor and city
council. 68 Washington courts, however, construe the term to include
voters exercising their duly reserved powers of initiative and referendum
as well.69
The court defined corporate authorities of municipal corporations in
the context of a city, in Citizens for Financially Responsible Government
v. City of Spokane.70 In Citizens, the Washington Supreme Court was
faced with a question of whether a city ordinance enacting a business and
occupation tax was subject to referendum '.7 Responding to a challenge
by a group of Spokane citizens,72 the city argued that the term "corporate
authorities" in article XI, section 12 referred solely to the legislative
body of the city and not to the residents themselves.73 The court rejected
the city's restrictive interpretation of the term, noting that in a statutory
setting, its prior holdings demonstrate that the phrase "'corporate
authority,' also referred to as a 'legislative authority,' means exclusively
the mayor and city council. 7 4 The court went on to hold, however, that
67. "The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or other
municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other
municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to
assess and collect taxes for such purposes." WASH. CONST. art. Xl, § 12.
68. Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't v. City of Spokane, 99 Wash. 2d 339, 344, 662
P.2d 845, 849 (1983) (citing State ex rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 50 Wash. 2d 23, 308 P.2d 684 (1957));
State ex rel. Bowen v. Kruegel, 67 Wash. 2d 673, 678-79, 409 P.2d 458, 462 (1965) (construing the
term "legislative body"); Neils v. Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 280, 53 P.2d 848, 852 (1936) (construing
the term "legislative authority"); State ex rel. Walker v. Superior Court, 87 Wash. 852, 854, 152 P.
I1, 12 (1915) (also construing the term "legislative authority").
69. Citizens for Financial Responsible Gov't, 99 Wash. 2d at 345-47, 662 P.2d at 849-50.
70. id.
71. Id.
72. The residents of Spokane sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Spokane to
accept for filing certain referendum petitions that would amend or repeal the city's business and
occupation tax. Id. at 340, 662 P.2d at 847.
73. Id. at 344, 622 P.2d at 848.
74. Id., 622 P.2d at 849 (citing State ex rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 50 Wash. 2d 23, 308 P.2d 684
(1957) (construing the term "corporate authorities")); Neils v. Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 280, 53 P.2d
848, 852 (1968) (construing the term "legislative authority"); State ex rel. Bowen v. Kruegel, 67
Wash. 2d 673, 678-79, 409 P.2d 458, 462 (1965) (construing the term "legislative body"); State ex
rel. Walker v. Superior Court, 87 Wash. at 854, 152 P. 11, 12 (1915) (also construing the term
"legislative authority"). Interestingly, the court also notes that other states, including California, have
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in a constitutional context, the term "corporate authorities" must be read
more expansively to include not only the mayor and city council, but also
the direct legislative power of the people acting through the initiative and
referendum processes. 75 In Washington, this means that the "corporate
authorities" of a municipal corporation consists of its legislative organ,
including the people acting through initiative and referendum.
In addition to being a good common sense construction, Citizens'
explanation of the term "corporate authorities" is also consistent with the
constitution's allocation of legislative power on the state level. Like state
representatives and senators, the elected officials of municipal
corporations are directly elected by and are accountable to city residents
burdened by city taxes, so it makes sense that these officers are also
referred to as "legislative authority." Given Washington's view that all
legislative power flows from the people, it is logical that elected officials
compose legislative power at the local level as well. 6
The definition of "corporate authorities" in Citizens is of limited
utility, however; Citizens was applied in the limited context of a city and
relied primarily on identifying the proper authorities of the city. As a
result, it does not provide a comprehensive working definition of the
term "for purposes of other types of municipal corporations." Hence, the
question of precisely how the corporate authorities of municipal
corporations must be constituted in order for a delegation of taxing
power to be constitutional requires looking elsewhere.
b. The Taxing Power May Be Delegated to the "Corporate Authorities"
of a Municipal Corporation when the Tax-Burdened Electorate Retains
Electoral Control Over it.
Although the Washington Constitution does not explicitly define
how the corporate authorities of a municipal corporation must be
composed in order for it to use the taxing power, close analysis of a
handful of cases demonstrates that the authorities must be elected by, and
accountable to, their tax-burdened electorate. 77 Washington cases have
adopted similar interpretations. Citizens for Financial Responsible Gov't, 99 Wash. 2d at 346, 662
P.2d 845 at 849-50.
75. Citizens for Financial Responsible Gov 't, 99 Wash. 2d at 345-47, 662 P.2d 845 at 849-50.
76. See supra Part 11.B.
77. Few Washington cases appear to deal directly with the issue of whether taxation without
representation has occurred, presumably because the concept is so axiomatic that it actually occurs
infrequently. In cases where the issue has arisen, the context typically involves a municipal
corporation taxing citizens beyond its borders. See Granite Falls Library Capital Facility Area v.
Taxpayers of Granite Falls Library Capital Facility Area, 134 Wash. 2d 825, 953 P.2d 1150 (1998);
Sunnyside Irrigation Dist. v. Foster, 102 Wash. 2d 395, 687 P.2d 841 (1984); Municipality of
Metropolitan Seattle, v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960); State ex rel. Tax
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long prohibited taxing schemes that permit "taxation without
representation," and modem state courts continue to show fidelity to the
doctrine.
Malim v. Benthien is one of the first reported Washington cases to
stand for the proposition that the taxing power may not be vested in
persons over whom taxpayers have no direct control.78 In Malim, a
diking district sought to assess benefited properties lying outside the
district with taxes to fund its projects, even though those outlying
properties could not participate in the election of diking district officers
who would make the assessments.79 Appellant taxpayers brought suit to
enjoin the assessments, arguing, among other things, that the assessments
violated article I, section 12 of the state constitution as well as the
privileges and immunities clauses of both the federal and state
constitutions. 80 Drawing also upon article I, section 19 of the Washington
Constitution, 81 the Washington Supreme Court agreed.82
The absence of accountability of those imposing the tax to those
who bore its burden was of overwhelming importance to the Malim
court. In particular, the court stated that the taxation of residents outside
the diking district "denie[d] the principle of self government, as it existed
from our earliest history and as it is preserved in our Constitution taken
as a whole." 83 The court went on to emphasize that the tax-burdened
landowners had no "voice" in the election of the diking district
commissioners, 84 that is, the respondents lacked the ability to elect the
commissioners and had no other viable mechanism by which their voice
could be heard. The court found the absence of these mechanisms to be
wholly incompatible with "the principle upon which our government is
founded, and that as a nation we have always maintained is the only true
principle upon which a free government can be founded and
maintained. 85
Comm'n. v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932); Malim v. Benthien, 144 Wash. 533, 196 P. 7
(1921).
78. 114 Wash. 533, 196 P. 7 (1921).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 534-35, 196 P. at 8.
81. That section provides that that "[a]ll [e]lections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil
or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." WASH.
CONST. art. 1, §19.
82. The court also implicitly rested its decision on the privileges and immunities clause in
article 1, § 12 of the state constitution. See Foster, 102 Wash. 2d at 405-06, 687 P.2d at 847
(discussing Malim).
83. Malim, 114 Wash. at 537-38, 196 P. at 9; see also supra Parts IL.A-B (discussing the
constitutional origins and justifications of the taxing power).
84. Malim, 114 Wash. at 537-38, 196 P. at 9.
85. Id. at 539, 196 P. at 9.
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Additionally, the court noted that the unrepresented taxpayers
would essentially be subject to the diking district assessments in
perpetuity. 86 Not only could taxpayers not hold those imposing the tax
accountable, but they could not "escape" from the tax either. The Malim
court's analysis thus focused on the tax-burdened electorate's ability to
use its political power to hold those imposing taxes upon them
accountable for their tax-related actions. Malim, therefore, stands for the
proposition that taxing power may not be exercised by municipal
officials who are neither directly elected by nor otherwise accountable to
the taxpaying electorate.
State v. Redd, a later Washington Supreme Court case, reiterates the
Malim holding.8 7 In Redd, the state tax commission acted pursuant to
state law to reassess lands in Franklin County in an amount greater than
the value assigned by the local assessor.88 The county treasurer-assessor
then appealed a lower court order requiring him to use the state
commission's valuation, arguing, among other things, that the state
statute empowering the commission violated article XI, section 12 by
empowering state officials-whom Franklin County residents had no
voice in electing-to reassess taxes imposed for local purposes. 89 This,
appellants argued, denied them their constitutionally secured right of self
government. 90
In an opinion relying heavily on sources from other jurisdictions,
the Washington Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional. 9' The
court quoted an Illinois case construing a similar provision in the Illinois
Constitution as being designed "to prevent the legislature from granting
the power of local taxation to persons over whom the population to be
taxed could exercise no control, '92 and observed that its purpose is to
86. Id.
87. State ex rel. Tax Comm'n. v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932).
88. Id. at 133, 6 P.2d at 620.
89. Id. at 134-35, 6 P.2d at 620-2 1.
90. Id. at 135-36, 6 P.2d at 621.
91. Id. at 135, 6 P.2d at 621.
92. Id. at 141, 6 P.2d at 623 (quoting Harward v. St. Clair & Monroe Levee & Drainage Co.,
1869 WL 5283 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Jan. Term, 1869)). This quote continues that "... . it is evident that, by
the phrase "corporate authorities," must be understood those municipal officers who are either
directly elected by such population, or appointed in some mode to which they give their assent."
This language appears to permit the electors of a particular municipality to consent to the delegation
of taxing power, but this cannot be the case. First, the Washington court did not explicitly
incorporate this language into its holding. Secondly, the context of the Illinois case was "who"
constituted the corporate authorities of the entity, not how they must be constituted. Moreover, even
if it was intended to permit the electors of a particular municipality to consent to the delegation of
taxing power, it is an unwise rule. The electors of any particular generation should not be able to
forfeit their constitutional rights to elect and hold accountable those that impose a tax, nor should
they be permitted to forfeit the same rights of future generations. A rule that enabled such acts would
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"give force and effect to the principle of local self government which has
always been regarded as fundamental in our political institutions, and to
be the very essence of every republican form of government." 93 The
court concluded that enabling the state tax commission to revalue local
property for local tax purposes was fundamentally incompatible with this
"home rule" principle. 94 Thus, like Malim, Redd found the total absence
of a meaningful electoral "voice" that could remove or retain officials
empowered to tax to be inconsistent with the constitution.
The Washington courts waited more than fifty years after Redd
before again addressing whether the electorate had to be provided with a
voice in electing officials empowered to levy taxes. 95 In Sunnyside
Irrigation District v. Foster,96 residential landowners were assessed a tax
by a local irrigation district, even though they were barred by state
statute from voting for members of the district's board. 97 Appellant
taxpayers brought suit, arguing, among other things, 98 that the state
statute99 violated article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution.100
The Foster court's analysis affirms and elaborates the principles
relied upon in both Malim and Redd. Employing an equal protection
analysis, it first recognized that "the right to vote is fundamental to our
representative form of government'o under both the United States and
Washington Constitutions. '0 2 It then determined that article I, section 19
requires that constitutionally qualified electors "significantly affected by
the [government's] decisions [must] be given an opportunity to vote for
the representatives of their choice,"' 0 3 and acknowledged that article I,
section 19 permits, in certain situations, restricting the right to vote on an
surely be repugnant to the constitution and the principles of self government upon which it is based.
Certain states with similar constitutional provisions that permit the vesting of the taxing power in the"corporate authorities" of municipal corporations have construed that term to mean either officers
that have been elected by the people or who have been appointed in some manner assented to by the
people. 16 MCQUILLN, supra note 58, § 44.24.
93. Redd, 166 Wash. at 144, 6 P.2d at 624 (quoting Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N.Y. 459, 468, 45
N.E. 15, 17 (1896)).
94. Id. at 147, 6 P.2d at 625.
95. This is probably because of the widespread understanding and acceptance of the doctrine.
96. 102 Wash. 2d 395, 687 P.2d 841 (1984).
97. Id. at 398, 687 P.2d at 843.
98. Appellants also alleged violations of the federal and state equal protection clauses. Id. at
403, 687 P.2d at 846.
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 87.03.045 (1996).
100. Appellants also charged a violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States
and Washington Constitutions. The court, however, did not address the equal protection argument in
its opinion. Foster, 102 Wash. 2d at 403, 687 P.2d at 846.
101. Id. at 407, 687 P.2d at 848.
102. Id. at 404, 687 P.2d at 846 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Malim v.
Benthien, 114 Wash. 533, 196 P. 7 (1921)).
103. Id. at 410, 687 P.2d at 849.
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issue or for a representative to persons directly affected by them."°4 The
court held, however, that those qualified electors significantly affected
by local taxing decisions must be given an opportunity to vote for
representatives who impose them.10 5 Like in Malim, the court in Foster
found justifications for excluding appellants from the voting scheme
unconstitutional, and confirmed that Washington law requires that voters
who are significantly affected by a municipality's taxing decisions be
given a voice in the election of its representatives. 
1 6
Together, Malim, Redd, and Foster make clear that Washington
prohibits the taxing power from being exercised by the corporate
authorities of municipalities over which the tax burdened electorate has
no control. Each case emphasizes that the tax burdened electorate must
have a "voice" in electing those who impose taxes on them. These cases,
however, afford little instruction as to what types of "control" must exist
over corporate authorities to ensure that the electorate's "voice" is
meaningfully heard. However, three Washington cases-Municipality of
Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, Cunningham v. Municipality of
Metropolitan Seattle (the "Metro Cases"), and Granite Falls Library
Capital Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls Library Capital
Facility Area-suggest an answer to this constitutional question.
c. Electoral "Voice" Requires Corporate Authorities to be Directly
Elected by, and Accountable to, the Tax-Burdened Electorate.
Washington law requires that corporate authorities who exercise the
taxing power remain subject to the "voice" of the electorate. 0 7 Stated
differently, officials must be elected by, and remain accountable to, those
residents burdened by the tax. For constitutional purposes, electoral
"voice" requires that tax burdened voters have a direct say in the election
or removal of taxing officials.
i. Appointed Officials May Levy Taxes if They are Directly
Accountable to the Tax-Burdened Electorate.
Washington cases that bear directly on how the corporate
authorities of a municipal corporation must be composed in order for the
tax-paying electorate to retain control over it indicate that the electorate
104. Id. at 408, 687 P.2d at 848-49. The specific provision involved here was article I, section
19 (Freedom of Elections), which provides that "All Elections shall be free and equal, and no power,
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." Id. at
404, 687 P.2d at 847; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
105. Foster, 102 Wash. 2d at 410, 687 P.2d at 850.
106. Id.
107. See supra Part I.C. I.b.
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must have a means of expressing its voice by directly or indirectly
removing those responsible for levying a tax. 0 8 The case of Municipality
of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle illustrates this requirement
well. 109 In Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld a state statute authorizing the creation of
metropolitan municipal corporations, finding it consistent with the
representative form of government."l0
Pursuant to state law, the cities of the Lake Washington Drainage
Basin voted to form a regional municipal corporation ("Metro") that
possessed certain tax powers."' The City of Renton, however, requested
to be excluded from Metro's boundaries and ultimately voted against
forming Metro.' 2 In an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, appellants contended, among other things, that the statute permitted
taxation without representation in violation of the Due Process Clauses
of the state and federal constitutions." 3 More specifically, appellants
argued that Metro was unconstitutionally empowered to tax the citizens
of Renton because it was governed by a board consisting of fifteen
appointed members who were not "entirely elected by the people of
Renton." 14
The court, however, disagreed. It reasoned that, even though the
residents of Renton voted against being included in Metro, they did have
108. See supra Part I1.C.1 .b-c.
109. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 357 P.2d 863
(1960).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 449, 357 P.2d at 866.
112. Id. at 448, 357 P.2d at 866.
113. Id. at 453-54, 357 P.2d at 868-69. In a related argument, appellants also contended that
the corporation's ability to tax violated article XI, section 12, and that it imposed upon the citizens of
Renton taxation without representation. Id. at 453, 357 P.2d at 868. The court, however, rejected
appellants' article XI, section 12 claim. Instead, it found that article Xl, section 12 had not been
violated because, in voting to create the metropolitan municipal corporation, local voters had voted
to impose whatever taxes would be necessary to fund it. Id. In other words, when voters in Metro
voted to create it, they "acquiesce[d] to the imposition of the tax which is necessary to carry out [its]
purposes[.]" Because the voters had implicitly approved the taxes necessary to fund metro when the
approved metro's creation, the state could not be fairly considered the entity imposing the tax.
Quoting itself, the court reiterated that as long ". . . as the tax is imposed by the corporate authorities
[of Metro] the evil sought to be avoided by [article XI, section 12] is not incurred. In this case, the
burden being self-imposed, there is no room to exclaim against legislative power. " Id. The court's
analysis here demonstrates that article XI, section 12 analyses necessarily focus on who/what entity
is imposing the tax. This is an inquiry distinct from how the entity imposing the tax is constituted. In
Metro, the question the court sought to address was whether metro or the state was imposing taxes
for metro's local operations, not whether article XI, section 12 implicitly required metro's governing
body to be composed of elected officials if it is to impose a tax. Id. (indicating that the taxation
without representation argument rests on article 1, section 3 of the state constitution and the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution).
114. Id. at 453, 357 P.2d at 868-69.
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a voice in its creation.' 15 The court also noted that Renton was ensured a
continuing voice on the council by a provision in Metro's governing
statute that required the automatic appointment of Renton's mayor or one
of its city councilmen to a Metro Council position." 16 Thus, unlike the
taxpayers in Malim, Redd, and Foster, the taxpaying voters of Renton
were able to directly exercise their approval or rejection of Metro's tax
policy vis-A-vis the statutory appointment of their elected city official to
the Metro Council. Therefore, Renton residents retained their political''voice" in a meaningful fashion.
The language in Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle underscores
the importance of the fact that Metro's governing council consisted
entirely of elected officials that were automatically appointed to the
council by statute from Metro's constituent counties and cities. 117
According to the court, it was that relationship that ensured that Metro
was consistent "with the representative form of government which the
constitution demands." 18 In other words, because Metro council
members were all appointed from "the ranks of elected officers residing
within the region[,]" they were sufficiently accountable to their
constituents to employ the taxing power.' 9 Hence, even though Metro's
board was entirely appointed, the court considered it to be accountable to
and removable by taxpaying constituencies of Metro's electorate because
its members all held concurrent offices elected by the local constituent
municipalities. 120 Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle therefore stands
for the proposition that taxpayers have a sufficient "voice" over
appointed officials who exercise the taxing power when those officials
concurrently hold an elected office directly accountable to the tax-
burdened electorate and are automatically appointed by statute.
Cunningham v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle confirms this
interpretation. 121 Though Cunningham dealt chiefly with an equal
protection challenge to Metro's voting scheme, the opinion included an
analysis of whether the Metro board should be characterized as appointed
or elected. 122 The court determined that the automatic statutory
appointment of local elected officials-who were accountable to Metro's
115. Id. at 453-54, 357 P.2d at 868-69.
116. Id. at 454, 357 P.2d at 869.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 454, 357 P.2d at 869; but see Cunningham v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle,
751 F. Supp 885, 892-93 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (indicating that only a majority of appointed members
were elected from constituencies of Metro at that time).
119. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 454, 357 P.2d
863, 869 (1960).
120. Id.
121. Cunningham, 751 F. Supp. at 891.
122. Id. at 891-93.
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local taxpaying electorate by virtue of their locally elected positions-
should be characterized as elected, rather than appointed, officials. 123
According to the court, "while a candidate for [local office] is not listed
on the ballot as a candidate for the Metro Council, he is in fact running
for both offices. The result is exactly the same as if the ballot title read
"[local office]/Member of Metro Council."' 124 The Cunningham court
found that, because a majority of Metro Council seats were elected, the
council as a whole must be considered elected in character. 125 Thus,
under the Metro Cases, the taxing authority may be delegated to
municipal corporations governed by appointed boards when those boards
are composed of at least a majority of members who concurrently hold
an elective office directly accountable to the tax burdened public and are
automatically appointed by statute. Since officials appointed to such
positions remain directly accountable to tax-paying voters, their voices
are preserved, and taxation without representation is avoided.
Though the rule from the Metro Cases is consistent with
Washington's constitutional requirements, the Washington Supreme
Court has unnecessarily blurred its "no taxation without representation"
jurisprudence and has raised new questions about the malleability of its
boundaries.
ii. Granite Falls Affirms the Washington Rule, but
Obscures the Boundaries of Accountability.
The most recent Washington case to address the boundaries of
citizen voice and control over officials using the taxing power is Granite
Falls Library Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls Library
Capital Facility Area.126 While the decision affirms Washington's ban on
taxation without representation, the analysis obscures the boundaries of
what constitutes sufficient control over taxing officials for purposes of
avoiding taxation without representation. In Granite Falls, Snohomish
county voters approved a ballot measure calling for the formation of a
library facility area to be constructed in Snohomish County Council
districts one and five. 127 No portion of the area would exist in districts
two, three, or four. 28 The vote also authorized the area to issue up to
$1.6 million in bonds, and approved the levy of annual excess property
123. Id. at 891.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 893.
126. Granite Falls Library Capital Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls Library Capital
Facility Area, 134 Wash. 2d 825, 953 P.2d 1150 (1998).
127. Id. at 829-31, 953 P.2d at 1152-53. Snohomish County is organized under the home rule
charter and is governed by a five member county council elected from five districts.
128. Id. at 831, 953 P.2d at 1153.
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taxes necessary to pay for and retire those bonds. 129 The governing body
of the area was to consist of three Snohomish County Council members
appointed by the council's full five members, 130 and was then
empowered to levy excess property taxes at a rate sufficient to pay the
bonds. 33 Appellant taxpayers argued that this arrangement permitted
taxation without representation, and that it denied them their right to
suffrage in violation of article I, section 19 of the Washington
Constitution.' 32 They also argued that, because the governing body was
not elected by the taxpayers and thus not subject to their control, its
powers violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 33
In a cursory analysis comprising just two sentences, the court found
the governing body to be sufficiently representative to avoid
constitutional infirmity, and in doing so implicitly affirmed the rule in
the Metro Cases. 134 To the extent that the court's reiteration of the
respondent's arguments evidence its reasoning, the governing board
"adequately represent[ed] the interests of the taxpayers because
designation of the county council members for the governing body [wa]s
a result of the election process."' 135 Hence, like the Metro Cases, the fact
that the governing board consisted of County Council members elected
by local taxpayers and appointed to the governing board ensured that
taxation without representation was avoided. 13
6
If the Metro Cases' rationale is the basis of the decision, however,
Granite Falls implies a more permissive approach to the boundaries of
electoral control than do its predecessors. Because it is a home rule
charter county, the five members of the Snohomish County Council are
129. Id. at 830, 953 P.2d at 1152.
130. Snohomish County has five districts that each elect one resident to serve as a
councilmember. Only registered voters in a particular council district are permitted to vote for
candidates nominated from such districts and may not vote for candidates from other districts. Id. at
832, 953 P.2d at 1153. While it is not clear how many appointed board members in Granite Falls
were accountable to the taxpaying voters of the districts comprising the library facility area, at least
one and as many as two (a majority) were. In both cases, all appointed board members concurrently
held some kind of elected office.
131. The rate was a direct function of the interest rate established by the governing body. Id.
831,953 P.2d at 1153.
132. Id at 839, 953 P.2d at 1157.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 842, 953 P.2d at 1158.
135. Presumably, this language refers to the fact that the governing board consisted of elected
Snohomish County Council members who were appointed as governing body members by the
enabling statute. Id.
136. This interpretation is consistent with the Metro Cases under the rationale that the
appointed governing board members' ability to levy taxes was legitimized by the fact that they
concurrently held elected office accountable to library facility area voters.
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elected from its five county districts. 137 Since the facility area embraced
only two districts, a maximum of two-and as little as none-of the
three governing body members could have been elected from the districts
that composed the facility area. As a result, the statute permitted a
scenario in which the governing board could have had no members who
were elected by taxpaying voters in the facility area.
The court, however, refused to find this potential fatal. It
recognized that it was possible that council members from districts not
included in the library facility area could potentially comprise the entire
board (and thereby not be directly accountable to the taxpaying electorate
of the area), but concluded that such a risk rested "solely upon
conjecture." '138 By failing to find unconstitutional a statutory framework
which permits a taxing authority to potentially consist of officials who
are not directly elected by taxpaying voters, the court left open the
possibility that there may be scenarios in which such an arrangement is
constitutional. 139
Granite Falls' approval of the manner in which library facility area
governing board members were appointed raises similar concerns.
Unlike Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, where all Metro Council
members were automatically appointed by statute, and Cunningham,
where a majority were, the five members of the full Snohomish County
Council themselves appointed three of its members to govern the library
facility area. 140 Permitting the council to appoint every governing board
member raises the possibility that it could insulate the board from the
electoral voice of the public by appointing council members not elected
by taxpayers. It also severs the electorate's ability to directly select and
remove a majority of the officials who have the power to tax-an ability
that was essential to sustain the constitutionality of similar schemes in
the Metro Cases. 141 As a result, Granite Falls' failure to find this
appointment procedure unconstitutional also raises the possibility that
taxing officials can, in some cases, be appointed without being elected: a
condition state courts have required for almost a century.
137. Granite Falls, 134 Wash. 2d at 831, 953 P.2d at 1153.
138. The board's actual composition is not clear from the text of the opinion or from the briefs
submitted to the court. Id. at 840, 953 P.2d at 1157.
139. Such a rule would stand in contrast to Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, where all
members held concurrently elected positions, and to Cunningham, where at least a majority did.
Another framework in which to view the decision would be to consider it in a "practical" light
wherein the court merely considered precisely what was before it.
140. Granite Falls, 134 Wash. 2d at 840, 953 P.2d at 1157.
141. Under the Metro Cases, the automatic appointment of elected officials is acceptable
precisely because voters retain the direct ability to exercise their voice by voting to appoint or
remove a majority of elected persons who will automatically ascend to an appointed seat. Such a rule
ensures that taxpaying voters retain direct control over at least a simple majority of taxing officials.
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Ultimately, Granite Falls is consistent with Washington's
prohibition on taxation without representation. There can be no doubt
that it implicitly affirms the Metro Cases and upholds Washington's
longstanding prohibition on taxation without representation, but it
nevertheless failed to strike down statutory provisions that could give
rise to a scenario in which taxing officials are neither elected by nor
unaccountable to the taxpaying public. Therefore, Granite Falls left
unanswered how far certain other provisions could be used to insulate a
municipal board empowered to tax. The composition and activities of the
SMP Board, however, clearly demonstrate that the court's silence does
not intimate its approval.
III. THE SMP HAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY LEVIED THE MVET.
Because the SMP is un-elected and unaccountable to Seattle
taxpayers, its levy of the MVET is unconstitutional. The SMP is a
municipal corporation governed by a nine-member board of directors, all
but two of whom are appointed. 142 Since the SMP is a municipal
corporation, it possesses no inherent power to levy a tax unless two
conditions are met. First, the legislature must delegate to it specific
taxing power.1 43 Second, the corporate authorities of the SMP must be
directly elected by Seattle voters subject to the MVET or, if appointed,
must concurrently hold elective office directly accountable to the Seattle
electorate. 144 Alternatively, the voters of Seattle, acting in their
legislative capacity, could levy the MVET themselves. 45 Here, the SMP
cannot be fairly said to satisfy any of these requirements.
Nevertheless, by its own terms, the SMP has levied the MVET at
varying levels within the voter-approved statutory maximum of 1.4%.146
Because the SMP is governed by a board of directors consisting
overwhelmingly of appointed officials who do not concurrently hold
elective offices accountable to Seattle voters, 14 7 its levy of the MVET is
unconstitutional. Voter approval of Petition 1 cannot cure this
142. Initially, all members of the SMP board were appointed. Petition 1, § 4(b). Two elected
positions, however, were added in 2003. Id. at § (4)(d)(2). A non-voting ex officio member has also
been added. See SMP Bylaws 2.10, available at http://www.elevated.orgLdownloads/board/
bylaws.pdf (Feb. 2, 2003); see also, SMP Board of Director Members and Bios, at http://
www.elevated.org/project/board/members (last visited July 17, 2005).
143. See supra Part II.C.
144. See supra Part I1.C.
145. See supra Part II.C.
146. See, e.g., SMP Board, Meeting Minutes, January 24, 2004; SMP Board, Meeting Minutes,
March 5, 2003; SMP Executive Committee, Meeting Minutes, February 26, 2003, at 2; SMP Finance
Committee, Meeting Minutes, Item 3, February 24, 2003.
147. Petition 1, § 4.
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unconstitutionality because it was an authorization for a properly
representative CTA to levy the MVET within the statutory maximum.
A. The SMP is a Municipal Corporation.
The SMP is a municipal corporation created pursuant to both the
Enabling Legislation and Petition 1.148 Petition 1 proposed creation of a
CTA called the SMP, 149 which, according to the Enabling Legislation, "is
a municipal corporation, an independent taxing 'authority' within the
meaning of article VII, section 1 of the state constitution, and a 'taxing
district' within the meaning of Article VII, section 2 of the state
Constitution."1 50 Petition 1 also defined the boundaries of the SMP as
being coextensive with the boundaries of Seattle. 51 The SMP is therefore
a municipal corporation that embraces the geographic boundaries of the
City of Seattle.
B. The SMP Has Levied the MVET.
The statutory framework establishing and governing the SMP
authorizes the delegation of specific taxing power. The Enabling
Legislation permits CTAs like the SMP to levy an MVET of up to
2.5%,152 and Petition 1 authorizes the SMP to "levy and collect a special
excise tax not to exceed 1.4% on the value of every motor vehicle owned
by a resident of the [city] for the privilege of using a motor vehicle."' 153
Petition 1 therefore expressly authorizes the SMP to levy an MVET at
the level the SMP deems appropriate, subject to a statutory maximum tax
of 1.4%.
The SMP has acted consistently with this interpretation of Petition
1, levying the MVET at at least two different levels over the course of
the past two years. As early as February 2003, Finance Committee
members engaged in discussions concerning the rate at which to levy the
MVET, considering factors such as the duration of construction and the
rate at which bonds could be repaid.' 54 Realizing that they needed to
"take action to levy the tax"'' 55 and that doing so at the maximum rate
would not preclude them from adjusting it in the future, the Finance
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.020 (2002); Petition 1, Introduction and § 1.
149. Petition 1, § 2(a).
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.020 (2002).
151. Petition 1, § I (providing a definition of"authority area").
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.080(i) (2002).
153. Petition I, § 6(a). The Petition's explanatory statement consistently states that the SMP
"could levy and collect a 1.4% motor vehicle excise tax."
154. SMP Finance Committee, Meeting Minutes, Item 3, February 24, 2003, available at
http://www.elevated.org/_downloads/meetings/02-24-03 FC Minutes.pdf (Feb. 24, 2003).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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Committee recommended levying the MVET at the full 1.4%. 156 Minutes
of the board's Executive Committee reveal a similar understanding of the
SMP's ability to levy the MVET at varying levels. 157 At its February 26,
2003 meeting, the Executive Committee analyzed evidence addressing
the direction of interest rates, how various interest rates would affect
costs of debt service, and how to obtain the best possible credit rating.
58
Evidence presented by Mr. Malarkey suggested that the maximum 1.4%
MVET was needed in order to obtain the best possible credit rating.'
59
Like the Finance Committee before it, the Executive Committee
unanimously resolved to recommend the maximum levy to the full
board. 160
Resolutions passed by the full SMP Board confirm its
understanding that it possessed the power to levy the MVET. The March
5, 2003 SMP Board meeting included discussions over whether to levy
the MVET at .85% or at the full 1.4%.161 While the board observed that
SMP is authorized to levy the MVET up to the 1.4% maximum, it
determined that less funding was needed at the time and that the tax
should therefore first be levied at the lower rate of .85%.162 When asked
when the full 1.4% would need to be levied, then Finance Director Mr.
Malarkey responded that the board had "flexibility to decide when to
levy the full amount" and that it might be necessary when there was
more "cost certainty."' 163 The board then resolved to "lev[y] a special
motor vehicle excise tax of 0.85% on the value of all motor vehicles
owned by residents of the City."' 64
Just ten months later, the board resumed discussions about levying
the tax at a higher rate.' 65 Minutes of the January 24, 2004 meeting
demonstrate that the board considered that raising the MVET from .85%
to the full 1.4% might be seen as a tax increase, but determined that the
maximum 1.4% was "what the voters approved and expect."' 66 Using
language identical to the March 27, 2003 resolution, the board "levie[d] a
special motor vehicle excise tax of 1.4% on the value of all motor
156. Id.
157. SMP Executive Committee, Meeting Minutes, 5, February 26, 2003.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161 . SMP Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, March 5, 2003, available at http://
www.elevated.org/_downloads/meetings/03-05-03_FirstBoard Minutes.pdf(Mar. 5, 2003).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. SMP Board, Meeting Minutes, January 24, 2004.
166. Id.
Seattle University Law Review
vehicles owned by residents of the City.' 167 Together, the discussions on
the part of the SMP and the resolutions that followed clearly show a
board who both believed and acted in a manner consistent with the
understanding that the SMP possessed the power to levy the MVET at
any level within the voter-approved 1.4%. Indeed, the board did levy the
MVET on at least two occasions.
1. The Voters Did Not Levy the MVET.
Seattle voter approval of Petition 1 does not constitute the people's
levying of the MVET. Petition l's authorization of up to a 1.4% MVET
was an authorization to the SMP to tax,' 68 not an actual levy of that tax.
Commonly, the state legislature will authorize a local municipal
corporation to levy a specific species of local taxation. This is a "first
level authorization." That municipality can then, through its duly elected
legislative body, pass a "second level authorization" (in the form of an
ordinance or resolution), which in fact levies the tax upon the local
voters. This scenario is consistent with constitutional tax principles
because local representatives of the tax-paying electorate have actually
levied the tax. In other words, the legislature's delegation of the taxing
power to the municipality presumes that the municipality's properly
elected legislative organ will properly levy the tax.
For instance, in the same 1997 election in which Initiative 41 was
presented to voters, Proposition 2 was on the ballot.' 69 Pursuant to state
legislation that empowers the city to levy taxes and issue bonds to fund
infrastructure improvements, Proposition 2 "authorize[d] the City to sell
up to $90,0,0,00 in general obligation bonds to pay for
transportation improvements, and to levy annual excess property taxes
necessary to pay for the bonds."' 170 This language therefore authorized
Seattle's elected City Council to pass a local ordinance that would issue
the specific amount of debt and levy the specific property tax.
Here, the Enabling Act and Petition 1 similarly act as first and
second level authorizations to the SMP to levy the MVET. The Enabling
Act delegates to cities the authority to create CTAs, such as the SMP,
167. SMP Board of Directors, Resolution 04-06 Regarding Levy of Special Motor Vehicle
Excise Tax, January 24, 2004, available at http://www.elevated.org/_downloads/meetings/01-24-
04_BoardMinutes.pdf (Jan. 24, 2004).
168. This term is used to mean the legislature's delegation/authorization of specific local taxes
as a first level authorization. The local government's delegation/authorization of certain taxation by
another local government can then be considered second level authorization.
169. See Voters Pamphlet Statement of City of Seattle Proposition 2, available at http://
www.ci.seattle.wa.us/seattle/ethics/el97a/vp/vp9711 04 /p2 _bt.htm (last visited July 16, 2005).
170. See id.
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with the power to levy specific types of taxes, including the MVET.' 7 '
Either the city's "legislative body" or its citizens must then approve
formation of the CTA, as well as the taxes proposed to fund it.17
2
In the case of Petition 1, however, voters did not levy a specific tax.
Instead, Petition 1 provided that the "[SMP] may levy and collect an
[MVET] not to exceed 1.4%,"' 173 it did not say that "the people hereby
levy an MVET of 1.4%";74 voters therefore authorized the SMP to levy
the tax at the appropriate level to fund the project within the 0% to 1.4%
range. This "not to exceed" language should be read as a second level
authorization that requires the SMP Board to levy the tax at the
appropriate level to fund the project, not as the actual levy of any tax up
to that amount by the voters. Here again, the SMP Board's own actions
and language support this reading of Petition 1. Because the SMP Board
is not directly elected by the Seattle voters, it is unable to levy that tax in
a manner consistent with the constitution. 
71
C. Seattle Taxpayers Do Not Have Sufficient Electoral Control
Over the SMP for it to Constitutionally Levy the MVET
The second condition necessary for the SMP to constitutionally
levy the MVET is for it to be subject to control of the electorate
burdened by the tax. 176 On this point, the SMP Board's unelected and
unaccountable composition plainly renders it constitutionally unfit to
levy the MVET. The Enabling Legislation enables CTAs to be governed
by appointed or elected persons, 77 and Petition 1 provides that the SMP
shall be governed by a nine member board. 178 Initially, the nine
appointed members of the ETC served as the SMP Interim Board, but
within fourteen months of voter approval, a new board was nominated
and appointed. 179 A majority of the first SMP Board members were
nominated by the Interim Board, with the remaining four seats appointed
by the Mayor and the Seattle City Council. 80 Thus, from its inception,
171. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.95A.020, 030 (2002).
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.030 (2002); see supra Part II.A.
173. Proposed Seattle Monorail Authority, Seattle Citizen Petition No. I, § 6, available at
http://www.elevated.org/_downloads/board/petition I .pdf (Apr. 28, 2003).
174. Id.
175. If Petition I had levied a 1.4% excise tax, the tax would be constitutional, because the
SMP would merely be administering ministerial collection and disbursement of the funds for the
project.
176. See supra Part II.C.
177. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.030(l)(a) (2002).
178. Proposed Seattle Monorail Authority, Seattle Citizen Petition No. 1, § 4, available at
http://www.elevated.org/_downloads/board/petition I .pdf (Apr. 28, 2003).
179. Id. at § 4(b).
180. Id. at § 4(b)(1).
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the SMP Board consisted entirely of un-elected members. Currently,
only two out of nine board members are elected, while seven are
appointed.181 Because a mere two members are presently elected at large
by Seattle voters,182 under neither Granite Falls or the Metro Cases can it
be fairly argued that the SMP Board is "elected": it has been, and
continues to be, overwhelmingly appointed in character, and thus is not
directly accountable to Seattle taxpayers.
Moreover, the mode of members' appointment severely limits any
sort of indirect accountability. Petition 1 provides that all appointed SMP
Board seats (seats one through seven) shall be nominated and appointed
by a combination of the SMP Board, City Council, and Mayor. 183
Positions one through three are nominated by the SMP Board and
appointed by the City Council.1 84 Positions four and five are nominated
by the City Council and approved by the SMP Board, and positions six
and seven are nominated by the Mayor and appointed by the SMP
Board.1 85 Thus, through its power of nomination and appointment, the
current SMP Board, not the tax-paying residents of Seattle, effectively
controls who fills seven out of nine SMP Board seats. In Granite Falls,
at least 33% and as many as 66% of the governing body seats were held
by appointed Snohomish County Council members, but here only 22% of
SMP seats are elected.1 86 Therefore, the SMP's percentage of members
unaccountable to the electorate is far lower than it was on the board in
Granite Falls, and it should not be considered consistent with
Washington State's ban on taxation without representation.
Moreover, Petition l's terms further limit the taxpaying public's
indirect control over the SMP Board, rendering it even more
unaccountable. Petition 1 explicitly prohibits anyone elected to a city
office from concurrently holding a board seat. 187 While no statutory
provision in the Enabling Legislation, Petition 1, or the SMP's bylaws
expressly bars board members from concurrently holding elected offices
in the King County government, the federal government, or other
government entity sharing jurisdiction with Seattle, no members
181 . Seattle Monorail Project, Board of Director Members and Bios, at http://
www.elevated.org/board/members (last visited July 16, 2005).
182. Petition 1, § 4.
183. Id. at § 4(d)(1). Positions I through 3 are to be nominated by the SMP Board and
appointed by the City Council, positions 4 and 5 nominated by the City Council and approved by the
SMP Board, and positions 6 and 7 nominated by the Mayor and appointed by the SMP Board.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. These calculations assume as few as one and as many as two out of three governing body
members were elected, whereas here there are only two out of seven members elected.
187. Petition 1, § 4(f)(3).
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presently hold such office. 188 Thus, unlike in Granite Falls and the Metro
Cases, Seattle voters cannot indirectly hold the overwhelming majority
of board members accountable for their actions by voting to retain or
remove them in some other concurrently elected office. The residents of
Seattle therefore have no meaningful voice in the appointment, retention,
or removal of the SMP Board members levying the MVET, which is a
plain violation of Washington law.
No viable alternative means for holding SMP Board members
accountable for their tax related actions actually exists. Petition 1
provides for removal of appointed board members only by a two thirds
vote of the other board members for reasons of "malfeasance,
misfeasance, or nonfeasance," as well as for felonies, "crimes of moral
turpitude," and "gross neglect of duties."' 189 Therefore, board members
are left primarily to police themselves and can only be removed on these
limited grounds. These grounds provide a much narrower range of
accountability than does the common democratic mechanism by which
elected officials are subject to electoral scrutiny for their legislative,
policy, and tax-related choices. The tiny group of persons empowered to
remove board members and the narrow grounds for doing so creates a
situation analogous to a runaway stagecoach: voters initially approve a
project but retain virtually no way of stopping it. 190 Such an abdication of
electoral control is not advisable and neither, importantly, is it consistent
with our state's prohibition on taxation without representation.
Language in the Enabling Legislation that provides very limited
circumstances under which a CTA may be dissolved reinforces this
view.' 9' It provides that a CTA may only "be dissolved by a vote of the
people residing within the boundaries of the authority if the authority is
faced with significant financial problems."' 92 While the definition of
188. Seattle Monorail Project, Board of Directors, at http://www.elevated.org/project/board
(last visited July 16, 2005).
189. Petition 1, § (4)(g)(l).
190. Recent events suggest that this "runaway stagecoach" that is not subject to sufficient
public oversight has made a number of management blunders that could cost the public. See, e.g.,
Deirdre Gregg, Daring Ride: Monorail Risk, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., May 13, 2005 (analyzing the
SMP's revenue and cost projections and arguing that the project's finances are "giving transportation
officials, finance experts, and lawmakers a great deal of concern"), available at http://
seattle.bizjoumals.com/seattle/stories/2005/05/16/story I .html.
191. Petition I has similar language: language in Petition 1 provides for the dissolution of the
SMP in limited circumstances. It states that the SMP "may be dissolved by a vote of the people
residing within the Authority Area, for the reasons stated in, and pursuant to, the Enabling
Legislation." Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.120 (2002) with Petition 1, § 7.
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.120 (2002) (emphasis added). The SMP's abandoning of its
financing plan in the wake of criticism by the state treasurer and city officials may be a sign that the
SMP is facing "significant financial problems." See Seattle Times Staff, Monorail Leaders Resign,
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"significant financial problems" is unclear, it is clear that the SMP
cannot be dissolved simply because Seattle voters disapprove of the
project, lose faith in its management, or determine that other taxing
strategies are more favorable. Surely, such limited oversight does not
constitute the meaningful voice of the people that is required by the state
constitution.
Moreover, the lack of direct and indirect accountability that
characterizes the SMP is likely to persist. In the unlikely event that a
board member is removed by his peers, board vacancies are filled in the
same manner and by the same person or entity as they were originally,
subject to "automatic reduction to five members in the event of
disqualification or vacancy of any board member."' 93 The SMP Board is
therefore designed to continue its appointive character, even if members
are removed.
Similarly, the Enabling Act provides no fixed duration for which
the MVET may be collected. In fact, the Enabling Act provides that a
CTA may covenant with its bondholders so that it "may not be dissolved
and shall continue to exist solely for the purpose of continuing to levy
and collect any taxes or assessments levied by it and pledged to the
repayment of debt."' 94 While it is true that the SMP Board is charged
with submitting a proposal to Seattle voters no earlier than November
2005 and no later than November 2009 that would make a majority of
the board seats elected by Seattle voters, 195 there is no guarantee that
Seattle voters would approve the measure. Hence, these provisions have
little real value.
It is true that the SMP Board is imbued with certain attributes that
create a modicum of accountability, but they are minor provisions that
are no substitute for the electoral accountability required by
Washington's Constitution. For instance, board members are required to
be registered voters of the authority area at the time of their appointment
and throughout their term, and are to be immediately removed from
office if they cease to be so registered. 196 Although this provision ensures
that SMP Board members are at least subject to the taxes they impose, it
does nothing to give the taxpaying electorate a "voice" in their retention
or removal. Elected officials from city council members to congressional
representatives share similar residential requirements, but are also
THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 4, 2005, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmI/monorail/
2002357262 webmonorail04.html.
193. Petition 1, § 4(g).
194. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.120 (2002).
195. Petition 1, § 4(i)(2).
196. Petition 1, § 4(0(1).
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subject to regular elections so that the electorate can approve or reject
their ongoing decisions. Similarly, the fact that SMP Board member
terms are limited to nine consecutive years does not provide voters with a
sufficiently meaningful voice, nor does it significantly ensure the board's
accountability to the public. 
197
Requiring a modicum of public involvement is similarly
insufficient. Petition 1 requires board members to seek public input
before making replacement nominations to the board1 98 and, pursuant to
the Enabling Legislation, the SMP itself is "subject to all standard
requirements of a governmental entity pursuant to RCW 35.21.759. ' 99
Together, these requirements provide for a minimum of public
involvement and impose a basic level of oversight with respect to the
SMP's activities. They do not, however, cure the fact that the SMP
Board itself cannot be directly or indirectly held responsible for its
actions in any meaningful fashion. Indeed, no Washington case has
upheld an otherwise unconstitutional taxing scheme merely because
these factors have been present. Ultimately, the absence of direct
electoral accountability effectively shears the public of its meaningful"voice," and should render the SMP Board's levy of the MVET
unconstitutional.
D. Voter Approval of Petition I 's Delegation of the
Taxing Power to the Unaccountable SMP Board
Cannot Cure its Unconstitutionality.
Despite voter approval of Petition 1, the Washington State
Constitution does not permit the forfeiture of fundamental voting rights
effectuated by the Enabling Act and Petition 1. Subject to the powers of
initiative and referendum, the sovereign people of Washington have
vested the tax power in the state legislature.20 0 The legislature may only
197. Id. at § 4(f)(2). This is particularly true of costs that are already locked in and/or
construction that is completed by 2009, well within the 9 year period.
198. Id. at § 4(e)(1)(B).
199. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.040 (2002). The referenced provision requires a basic level
of transparency for public officials. It provides that
[a] public corporation, commission, or authority created under this chapter, and officers
and multimember governing body thereof, are subject to general laws regulating local
governments, multimember governing bodies, and local governmental officials,
including, but not limited to, the requirement to be audited by the state auditor and
various accounting requirements provided under chapter 43.09 RCW, the open public
record requirements of chapter 42.17 RCW, the prohibition on using its facilities for
campaign purposes under RCW 42.17.130, the open public meetings law of chapter 42.30
RCW, the code of ethics for municipal officers under chapter 42.23 RCW, and the local
government whistleblower law under chapter 42.41 RCW.
200. WASH. CONST. art. 11, § 1; Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d
183, 238, 11 P.3d 762, 796-97 (2000).
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delegate that power to the legislative bodies of municipal corporations
that are accountable to the electorate subject to their tax-related
decisions. 201 Case law construing Washington's Constitution plainly
prohibits the delegation of the taxing authority to unelected municipal
bodies that are unaccountable to the taxpaying public. 202 This
fundamental doctrine ensures protection from oppressive taxation and
tyranny, and is guaranteed to each generation.
Allowing voters to approve the delegation of taxing power to
municipal corporations governed by unaccountable appointed leaders not
only violates the fundamental principles upon which our representative
government is based, but would enable the exigencies of present voters
to forfeit the democratic rights of future generations. The legislation that
creates the SMP creates just such a scenario. The Enabling Legislation
provides very limited circumstances under which the SMP can be
dissolved.20 3 The people of Seattle may only vote to dissolve the SMP if
it "is faced with significant financial problems,"2 0 4 but even if these
significant problems and corresponding vote occur, the SMP is entitled
to covenant with its bondholders so that it "may not be dissolved and
shall continue to exist solely for the purpose of continuing to levy and
collect any taxes or assessments levied by it and pledged to the
repayment of debt." 205 Moreover, the Enabling Act provides no
maximum duration for which the MVET may be collected: once
approved, Seattle voters effectively forfeited all meaningful mechanisms
by which they, and future voters, could stop or even reign in the taxes
imposed by the SMP. Because Petition I provides no definite end to
Seattle residents' MVET obligations, future voters will be saddled with
monorail debt obligations and MVET taxes for many years to come.
Allowing this arrangement to stand would affirm a policy that permits
voters of the current generation to effectively forfeit the democratic
principles and constitutional protections of future generations, a policy
that is surely incompatible with Washington's Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
Few can doubt the ambition of the SMP or deny the continued
support given to the project by Seattle voters for almost a decade. 20 6 If it
201. See supra Part IlCI.
202. See supra Part II.C. 1.
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.120 (2002); see supra Part IIi.C.
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.120 (2002); see supra Part 11I.C.
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.95A.120 (2002); see supra Part III.C.
206. Even after two of the SMP's leading board members resigned and the board publicly
abandoned its financing plan, almost half of all Seattle residents appear to continue to support the
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is half the project that its proponents suggest, it could truly provide the
City of Seattle with the traffic relief the city requires and could
revolutionize the way Seattlites live, work, and commute. 20 7 Its popular
support and potential benefits, however, do not relieve it from the
requirements of Washington's Constitution.
Consistent with the Anglo-American legal canon, Washington law
broadly prohibits taxation without representation. Cases from Malim to
Granite Falls affirm this principle and demonstrate that Washington's
Constitution permits the delegation of the taxing power to the corporate
authorities of local municipal corporations only when such authorities
consist of the duly elected representatives of the local tax-burdened
electorate, or when appointed officials concurrently hold elected office
accountable to districts of taxpayers subject to their taxes. This rule
ensures that the tax-burdened electorate retains a meaningful voice over
elected officials who levy taxes.
The SMP, however, falls short of this constitutional requirement.
Through the Enabling Act, the legislature has delegated to the SMP the
power to levy the MVET. Consistent with the Enabling Act's
authorization, Petition 1 authorized the SMP to levy up to a 1.4%
MVET, which it has done. In fact, the SMP has levied the MVET at both
.85% and 1.4%. Because the corporate authority of the SMP-the board
of directors-is composed overwhelmingly of appointed officials who
concurrently hold no office directly accountable to Seattle voters,
however, the SMP is constitutionally unable to levy the MVET.
Permitting the SMP to levy the MVET would effectively allow taxation
without representation since Seattle's voters have no way to express their
collective voice to retain, remove, or replace board members.
Although Washington courts should find that the SMP's levy of the
MVET is unconstitutional under current law, the facts surrounding the
project present an ideal opportunity for the Washington Supreme Court
to reaffirm and clarify its "no taxation without representation" doctrine.
While the Washington Supreme Court has spoken clearly in the past,
Granite Falls has muddied the application of this doctrine, leaving
questions about the extent to which the doctrine applies to appointed
boards. Washington courts should explicitly require the corporate
authorities of municipal corporations who exercise the taxing power to
be directly elected by the taxpaying electorate or appointed from among
SMP. Susan Gilmore, 52% of Voters Would Scrub the Monorail, New Poll Says, THE SEATTILE
TIMES, July 10, 2005, at Al.
207. See generally SMP Final Alignment and Station Location Report, Mar. 30, 2004,
available at http://www.elevated.org/_downloads/project/updates/FinalAlignmentStations.pdf (Mar.
30, 2004).
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the elected officials therein. Application of a clear rule to that effect will
ensure the preservation of the democratic principles upon which our
nation and state were founded, and will ensure'the accountability of local
government.
